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Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics
in Antitrust Analysis
Herbert Hovenkamp*
I.

Introduction

This article offers some thoughts about the present place of transaction cost
economics (TCE) in antitrust law, focusing particularly on contract arrangements
involving vertically related firms or complementary products. At this writing, thirty-five
years have passed since Oliver E. Williamson published Markets and Hierarchies:
Analysis and Antitrust Implications.1 At that time vertical price and nonprice restraints
as well as tying were unlawful per se.2 While not per se unlawful, both exclusive
dealing and vertical mergers were treated much more harshly than they are now, and so
was vertical integration by dominant firms. 3 TCE analysis of these practices lay largely
in the future, but it was destined to develop a line of thinking that avoided the extreme
positions of the two reigning schools of antitrust policy.
At one extreme was the “structural” school, which drew its impetus from a
number of sources, including the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914 and the expansion
of section 7 of that statute in 1950 to cover vertical mergers.4 At its origins lay the

*Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
Thanks to Erik Hovenkamp for reading a draft.
1
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
(1975). One of Williamson’s best pieces on the use of transaction cost economics in antitrust was
actually published a year earlier. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost
Considerations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (1974).
2
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (RPM unlawful per se),
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (RPM to be
governed by rule of reason); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum RPM unlawful per
se), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (maximum RPM brought under rule of
reason); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (vertical nonprice restraints
unlawful per se), overruled by Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 366 (1977) (vertical nonprice
restraints governed by rule of reason); Times-Picayune Publ’g. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953)
(stating per se rule for tying arrangements in the presence of tying market power); Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (dicta reaffirming per se tying rule).
3
Standard Oil Co. (Cal.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (condemning exclusive dealing under
harsh test); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (condemning vertical merger on
modest market shares). On vertical integration de novo, see United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106 (1911) (condemning vertical integration into collateral goods such as foil used in manufacturing
tobacco products); United States v. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (reversing dismissal of complaint
challenging cab manufacturer’s acquisition of operating licenses); United States v. Paramount Pictures,
334 U.S. 131 (1948) (same; vertical integration from motion picture production into distribution).
4
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006); Cellar–Kefauver Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1225. On the
amendments, see Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1592476
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Great Depression and the rise of monopolistic competition theory in the early thirties,5
which in different ways undermined our confidence that markets for manufactured,
product-differentiated goods would perform competitively. The industrial organization
theory of the structural school developed the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P)
paradigm, which saw firm structure as the principal determinant of anticompetitive
behavior and poor economic performance.6
Under the model, structure entailed
conduct of a certain kind, and the conduct entailed poor performance. As a result
conduct dropped out as a variable of interest and one could reason directly from
structure to performance.
The promoters of the S-C-P paradigm tended to believe that monopoly power
was widespread, as were the opportunities for its exercise.7 Building on a neoclassical
model in which sellers placed their goods on the market and purchasers bought them
mainly in single-shot transactions, they were suspicious of any type of “irregularity” or
deviation from common law contract models for distribution, generally seeing these as
instances of monopolistic conduct. This animosity showed up in competition policy in
various ways. One was discomfort with product differentiation and the blunting of
competition that was commonly thought to attend it.8 Another was elevated suspicion
about both ownership vertical integration and vertical contractual practices such as
tying, exclusive dealing, resale price maintenance or related restraints. Antitrust policy
became hostile toward all of them. At its core lay the “leverage” theory, which feared
that a monopolist could easily “exploit[] his dominant position in one market to expand
his empire into the next.”9
Much, although certainly not all, of this theory originated in the Harvard
economics department.10 Further, while structuralism is sometimes associated with a
Harvard school of antitrust, Harvard’s own economists and antitrust scholars
abandoned most of it more than thirty years ago, prior to the time that TCE became well
HARV. L. REV. 226, 234–36 (1960); Herbert Hovenkamp, Derek Bok and the Merger of Law and
Economics, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 515, 516 (1988).
5
EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933).
6
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’ L
217 (2009).
7
See, e.g., CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS (1959); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959); JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW
COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956).
8
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880–1960, 95
IOWA L. REV. 863, 911 (2010) (describing increasing ambivalence about product differentiation). See,
e.g., CHAMBERLIN, supra note 5, at123 (product differentiation as leading to excessive vertical
integration); BAIN, BARRIERS, supra note 7, at 142–43, 212 (1956) (product differentiation as barrier to
entry).
9
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992) (quoting TimesPicayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953), which in turn was paraphrasing United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948) (“When the buying power of the entire circuit is used to
negotiate films for his competitive as well as his closed towns, he is using monopoly power to expand his
empire.”)).
10
See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890–1955, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 311 (2009).
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established in the economics literature.11 The leverage theory itself never dominated
Harvard industrial organization theory or competition policy. Rather the concern was
foreclosure, or the idea that firms could use pricing, vertical restrictions or intellectual
property (IP) licensing practices to exclude rivals from otherwise profitable markets.12
At the other extreme was the Chicago school position, whose theory of vertical
integration began with the collapse of the “leverage” theory in the 1950s,13 and
developed into a more general argument that vertical ownership and contract integration
should be lawful per se, with perhaps an exception for practices shown to facilitate
horizontal collusion.14 As did the Harvard school, the Chicago school tended to see the
economic landscape in terms of competition and monopoly. They saw far fewer
situations where monopoly could be created or maintained for long periods, however,
and they disputed the notion that a monopolist in one market could readily leverage its
monopoly position into related markets.15
The critique of the leverage theory showed that in a basic tying situation a firm
with market power and the ability to charge prices above cost could not increase its
overcharge by tying or other forms of vertical integration. To the contrary, in the case of
successive or complementary firms with market power, combining two products or
process stages into a single firm would actually increase output and reduce price by
eliminating double marginalization.16
The dominant Chicago view about tying
established in the critique of leveraging was that it was a form of price discrimination,
which permitted a monopolist to extract more profits but also typically increased
output.17 As a result there was no reason based on economic welfare grounds for
condemning ties.
Since the 1970s both the old Harvard and the traditional Chicago positions have
moved from opposite directions toward the center, partly as a result of the influence of
transaction cost analysis. Today their differences on many issues are not all that
considerable. In 1978, only three years after Markets and Hierarchies was published,
Areeda and Turner produced the first three volumes of the Antitrust Law treatise, whose
11

See infra text accompanying notes 18–28. One exception is Einer Elhauge, who favors bringing
back the leverage theory of tying. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of
the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009).
12
See Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy, supra note 10, at 362–67. On foreclosure, see
infra text accompanying notes 139–47.
13
See, e.g., Ward Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19
(1957).
14
These views were consolidated and popularized by ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST P ARADOX :
A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); see also Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust
Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH (1976).
15
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1979).
16
See, e.g., Joseph Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950);
see also infra text accompanying notes 74–75.
17
Bowman, supra note 13.
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second volume entirely repudiated the leverage theory,18 and whose third volume very
substantially repudiated the structuralist position on vertical integration.19
The
recommendations offered by Areeda and Turner were starkly different from those
offered by Turner and Carl Kaysen two decades earlier in Antitrust Policy, indicating that
Turner himself had undergone a remarkable conversion experience.20
The Antitrust Law treatise originated at Harvard Law School in the 1970s with the
work of Phillip E. Areeda and Donald F. Turner. Antitrust Law is fundamentally a
resource for antitrust lawyers and legal scholars. It is not a work of economics, and it
has never explicitly embraced any particular economic “school.” At no time in its history
could it be identified with the old Harvard school, which was closely associated with the
structure-conduct-performance paradigm in industrial organization, and it has
consistently opposed applications of the leverage theory.21 Nor has it ever explicitly
embraced the Chicago school. The Antitrust Law treatise is in fact something of an
economics scavenger, picking and choosing among economics’ diverse theories for
doctrine that is both theoretically defensible and administratively useful. Its economics
reflects the fact that both the Harvard and Chicago schools have moderated their views
toward the center. To a significant extent it has embraced transaction cost analysis of
such things as vertical restraints, tying, exclusive dealing, exclusionary practices by
dominant firms, mergers, joint ventures, and enforcement costs. In sum, it has taken
advantage of the fact that transaction cost analysis does two things at the same time.
First, unlike the traditional leverage or “hostility” theory, it rejects the notion that the
practices in the list are inherently suspicious. Most of the time they are beneficial
because they reduce either production or transaction costs. At the same time, it also
rejects many assumptions about costless and instantaneous entry, easy resource
mobility, and limitlessly rational market participants that characterized the neoclassical
price theory approach to antitrust and have been attributed to Chicago school antitrust
analysis.
On tying and leverage, Areeda and Turner’s 1978 volumes completely accepted
the Chicago school critique of the leverage doctrine. They concluded that a firm with
market power in a tying product could charge an above-market price for a tied product
only by making a corresponding reduction in the tying product’s price. Otherwise a
rational person would not purchase.22 As a result, they concluded, the purchaser of the
tied-up package “was not injured” by an overcharge. Indeed, the authors somewhat
optimistically opined that the Supreme Court, given its recent decision in Fortner II, was

18

2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 347a, b (1978).
19
See 3 id., ch. 7D.
20
See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 7 (advocating harsh rules for tying, exclusive dealing, and
vertical mergers). See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Areeda/Turner on Antitrust: A Hobson’s
Choice, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 735 (1996).
21
See Hovenkamp, supra note 10.
22
See 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 18, ¶ 347, at 251 (“[U]nless the benefit equaled or exceeded
the increment, a rational person in the plaintiff’s position would not have entered into the arrangement at
all.”).

Hovenkamp

Transaction Costs Economics in Antitrust

November, 2010, Page 5

on the verge of recognizing that fact.23 In the same discussion Areeda and Turner
acknowledged that a principal use of variable proportion ties, as in franchises, is price
discrimination. Once again they rejected leveraging and argued that such ties are
nothing more than substitutes for a royalty based on sales for use of the franchisor’s
“name and methods.”24 In this case “[t]he defendant was certainly entitled to charge a
franchise fee, and the plaintiff’s voluntary entry into the . . . business demonstrated that
the incremental charge for the tied item was what the plaintiffs were willing to pay for the
franchise.”25 Areeda and Turner then concluded:
Now there is one ground on which the plaintiff might claim that he was
injured by the tie. In cases like Chicken Delight,26 the tie facilitates price
discrimination. By requiring the franchisee to pay an incremental price on some
product whose use varies in proportion to his business, the franchisor collects
more from the more successful franchisee than from the less successful—just as
is customarily and lawfully done through a franchise fee based on the
franchisee’s gross (or net) revenues.”27
They concluded, however, that even the successful franchisee forced to pay more for
the franchise as a result of a price discrimination tie suffers no antitrust injury. A
franchisee fee based on revenues would clearly have been lawful and would have
caused no greater harm.28
Speaking more generally of vertical integration by the monopolist, Areeda and
Turner largely repudiated a half-century of hostility toward vertical integration in the
structuralist economic literature, concluding:

23

•

“Without substantial market power at any one production or distribution stage,
vertical integration lacks antitrust significance. It is either competitively
neutral or affirmatively desirable because it promotes efficiency.”29

•

On leveraging: “There is a maximum monopoly profit to be earned from the
eventual sale of an end product . . . . Unless there are diseconomies of
integration, monopolization of a second stage would not ordinarily lead to
higher prices or lower output . . . . Vertical integration by a monopolist can
lead to lower prices, higher output, and other economic benefits where the

Id. at 252 (“The Supreme Court may thus be ready to recognize, when it focuses on the question,
that such plaintiffs as Fortner have not suffered injury,” speaking of the Supreme Court’s two decisions in
Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), and 429 U.S. 610 (1977)). The Fortner cases
involved tying of expensive homes with below market rate financing.
24
2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 18, ¶ 347, at 253. [HH: can you leave date in here? Point is that
this was stated in the original edition, not the current edition]
25
Id.
26
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) (condemning a franchise tie of
common consumable goods by a nonmonopolist without requiring any showing of market power other
than the franchisor’s trademarks).
27
2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 18, ¶ 347, at 253–54.
28
Id. ¶ 347, at 254.
29
3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 18, ¶ 724, at 195.
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second stage had previously been monopolized or otherwise characterized by
non-competitive performance.”30
•

On double marginalization,31 Areeda and Turner recognized that “[i]ntegration
of two successive monopolies can lead to a higher output and a lower endproduct price.”32 Further, if successive monopolists were able to agree with
each other they could reach the joint maximizing level, resulting in lower
prices and higher output. In Coasean fashion they concluded that upon
recognizing double marginalization, “rational successive monopolists would
treat themselves as a unit in order to set that end-product price and output
that maximize aggregate profit . . . .” Further, when such an agreement was
impossible, “forward integration into what was previously a monopoly or
oligopoly stage is likely to improve matters.”33

Additionally, in both the original and current editions the Antitrust Law treatise
has opposed the recognition of a Sherman Act section 2 “monopoly leveraging” offense,
involving the use of monopoly power in one market to leverage a competitive advantage
in a second market.34
Perhaps Areeda’s and Turner’s greatest sensitivity to transaction costs lay in
their attempt to formulate antitrust rules so as to reduce administrative and error costs.
For example, they repeatedly argued that antitrust lacks the machinery to consider long
run problems or engage in fine theoretical analysis. Thus, for example, they argued for
the average variable cost test in predatory pricing,35 a proposal that Williamson later
faulted for creating a “defendant’s paradise”36 and that the Chicago school’s Richard A.
Posner has characterized as “toothless.”37 In subsequent years the Antitrust Law
treatise increasingly embraced transaction cost analysis in ad hoc fashion, noticeably in
its analysis of vertical integration by the monopolist, vertical and conglomerate mergers,
vertical price and nonprice restraints, tying, exclusive dealing, joint ventures and IP
licensing.38
Robert Bork’s Antitrust Paradox, which was published the same year as Areeda’s
and Turner’s original volumes, clung to a more orthodox Chicago position. Bork cited
Williamson’s work several times, although on merger efficiencies rather than transaction
30

Id. ¶ 724, at 198; see also id. ¶ 725b at 199 (against leveraging; “[n]o ‘double’ monopoly profit”).
For an explanation, see infra text accompanying notes 74–75 and accompanying figure.
32
3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 18, ¶ 725c, at 200-201..
33
Id.
34
In the original edition, seeid., ¶626d-g, at 79-83; In the current edition, see ¶652 at 130-142 (3d
ed. 2008).
35
3 id., ch. 3C.
36
Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 305
(1977).
37
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 217–23 (2d ed. 2001).
38
See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 7D (vertical integration by
monopolist), ch. 16 (vertical price and nonprice restraints), ch. 17 (tying), ch. 18 (exclusive dealing), chs.
19–22 (horizontal agreements; licensing practices; joint ventures) (2d & 3d eds. 2004–2010).
31
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cost economics.39 Nevertheless, certain positions that we instinctively associate with
the Chicago school, such as Lester Telser’s free rider explanation for resale price
maintenance (RPM), are in fact a form of transaction cost analysis. While Telser did not
explicitly rely on Coase, his well-known essay on RPM is about the costs of alternative
mechanisms for provision of retailer services. For example, Telser concluded that a
firm would choose self-distribution or distribution through independent agents
depending on the relative costs of doing so.40 Further, he argued, in the absence of
RPM retailers would offer differing levels of service depending on their own individual
cost and demand functions. The manufacturer might try to use contract provisions to
require optimal dealer services, but monitoring and enforcement costs would make
these unattractive.41 As a result, RPM was often the best solution, permitting dealers to
compete with each other in service provision until their costs rose to the maintained
price.42 Further, this investment in RPM performed a consumer education function that,
at the margin, was a substitute for direct national advertising to consumers.43 These
were distinctively transaction cost arguments, as Oliver Williamson himself would later
recognize.44
Interestingly, Bork’s chapter on vertical restraints and RPM45 says almost
nothing about transactions costs and makes very brief mention of free-rider problems,46
which by that time had a well-established Chicago School literature. He concluded,
largely from an analysis of market power and the severely limited opportunities for
expanding it by vertical contracting, that “every vertical restraint should be completely
lawful.”47 Of course one must not forget that Ronald Coase, who must be considered
the grandparent of TCE if Williamson is the parent, himself spent the greater part of his
career at the University of Chicago. Bork did not cite him. For Bork, monopoly is what it
is, cannot be expanded contractually, and is readily dissipated by new entry.
To say that the rise of transaction cost economics is solely responsible for the realignment of antitrust policy that has occurred since the 1970s is certainly an
exaggeration. However, TCE has helped antitrust develop a new “center,” which has
influenced both the case law and the academic literature in ways that are difficult to
exaggerate. TCE’s powerful analytic tools function simultaneously as a critique of both
39

See BORK, supra note 14, at 107–12 (merger efficiencies); at 123–25 (efficiencies as an antitrust
defense generally); at 127–32 (same, focusing on mergers); at 179, 196, 219 (same).
40
See Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 87 (1960).
41
Id. at 94 (“[I]t is easier to police violations of minimum prices than to survey retailers to see that
they do indeed provide the special services.”).
42
Id. at 90.
43
Id. at 94–95.
44
See Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the
Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 959 n.26, 983 & n.101 (1979) (disputing Posner’s
memory of the Schwinn litigation and recognizing Telser’s free rider argument as a transaction cost
approach).
45
BORK, supra note 14, at 280–98.
46
Id. at 290. Bork does mention free rider problems again in an appendix on market division and
price fixing. Id. at 430–31, 435.
47
Id. at 288.
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the leverage theory and the belief that pricing and vertical practices are virtually never
anticompetitive. The result has been to position antitrust analysis somewhere in the
middle, although somewhat closer to the Chicago “benign” position than to the inherent
hostility position reflected by structuralism and the traditional leverage theory.
II.

Antitrust, Markets, and TCE

Antitrust policy must make reasonable assumptions about both the goals of
business firms and their capabilities. We generally assume that business firms organize
their activities so as to maximize their value, which they can do both by economizing, or
reducing costs, and also by obtaining profits from sales at prices in excess of cost.
Today we largely accept Coase’s position that a firm’s structure is determined by its
continuous comparison of the costs and benefits of internal production against those of
market procurement. Perhaps departing from Coase, however, sensible antitrust policy
recognizes that both advantageous contracting and monopoly can be profitable to a
firm, and it can be expected to pursue both when they are available. Nevertheless, the
opportunities for economizing are many, while those for monopoly are relatively few.
Further, firms always make decisions from the perspective of their present
position, which necessarily includes the consequences of decisions made in the past.
The movement of resources from the current position is costly, and one of these costs is
that of relying on the market. One of the first choices firms must make is whether to use
internal production or external procurement for a particular input or process.
Economizing on this decision requires selection of the alternative that will produce the
greatest marginal value, and the aggregation of these decisions will determine the firm’s
boundaries. The boundary of the firm lies along the line where the marginal cost of
internal production and that of market procurement are in equipoise.48
Remaining business must be conducted by reaching agreements with others.
When products and distribution are specialized, many of a firm’s contractual
arrangements with others must necessarily be of long term and somewhat open ended,
in the sense that they do not anticipate every conceivable circumstance. As a general
matter, product differentiation specializes firms at all levels and this has two effects.
First, it tends to make firms larger vertically, because the cost of internal production is
relatively lower and the cost of market procurement relatively higher. Secondly, insofar
as a firm uses external procurement its contractual relationships become more durable
and more complex because the parties must often make substantial commitments to the
technologies and product designs of their trading partners.49 For all such agreements,
however, the firm assumes that trading partners are rational maximizers of their own
value and will exploit every value-creating opportunity that the market presents. While
all participants are rational, they do not have perfect information and they almost always
know more about themselves than about others. A rational firm anticipates that, to the

48

See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutonalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 85 IND. L.J. (forthcoming
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1538279.
49
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 66, 93–119 (1996).
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extent uncertainty exists, everyone in the market will try to use new situations to their
own advantage, itself included.
Finally, and significantly, one of the many costs of resource movement is the
administrative cost of the cumbersome and imperfect machinery antitrust uses to
analyze and deter anticompetitive practices. To the extent that the goal of competition
policy is to increase wealth, administrative costs may counsel that certain practices be
left unchallenged because the gains from enforcement will not exceed losses when
enforcement costs themselves, including error costs, are included.50
This framework generally produces antitrust rules that are far more benign than
the old “hostility” tradition, but somewhat more aggressive than the Chicago school
promoted. Most importantly, while transaction costs and other resource movement
costs provide benign explanations for many practices that the hostility tradition
condemned, they can occasionally have the opposite effect. For example, transaction
costs can create entry barriers or make other forms of market movement sticky and thus
increase both the possibility and duration of monopoly. In a well functioning market a
manufacturer and its dealers will bargain to the maximizing position, which is also the
position that benefits consumers. In the real world, however, transaction costs may
enable dealer cartels or powerful individual dealers to impose restraints that are
competitively suboptimal for both the manufacturer and consumers. In that case,
antitrust has a role to play.51
One important conceptual tool for antitrust analysis is what might be called a
“Coasean,” as opposed to neoclassical, market. Williamson has repeatedly noted that
the fundamental unit of analysis in TCE is the transaction: “The transaction is the basic
unit of analysis, whereas orthodoxy [neoclassicism] is concerned with composite goods
and services.”52 While that is true, it assumes away the critical question of who
transacts with whom. A distinctive feature of TCE is that it does not assume that each
trader has a range of trading partners that is coextensive with the product and
geographic market at issue. Rather, transactions occur in a setting that limits the range
of trading partners depending on knowledge, previous investment or technological
commitment, and past history. This limited range in turn affects the types of contracts
that the partners make with one another. In sum, the question of who can trade is at
least as important as the question of the terms of trading.
Ronald Coase’s famous essay, The Problem of Social Cost, examined economic
relationships in very small markets.53 The best-known example in that article is the
bargaining that occurred between Sturges and Bridgman, a physician and confectioner
50

See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 54–56
(2005).
51
See infra text accompanying notes 84–90.
52
WILLIAMSON, supra note 49, at 6; see also id. at 26, 45, 235; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15–42 (1985).
53
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see Herbert Hovenkamp,
Coasean
Markets,
29
EUR. J.L. &
ECON.
(forthcoming
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1580059.
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who were the parties to a now-famous common law nuisance suit.54 The two owned
adjacent businesses connected by a party wall in the same building. Physician Sturges
complained that when Bridgman operated his mechanical mortar and pestle the
thumping noise made it impossible for Bridgman to practice medicine—in particular, to
use his stethoscope.55 Bridgman brought a successful nuisance action against Sturges,
but Coase used the case as a vehicle to explain that the common law of nuisance is not
about wrongdoers, but rather about inconsistent uses and the assignment of legal rules
to decide which one should be favored. Coase famously argued that in the absence of
transaction costs the parties would reach a bargain that was both efficient, in the sense
that it maximized the parties’ joint wealth, and invariant to the underlying legal rule. This
latter statement meant that if the parties were able to bargain their way to a settlement,
the more valuable use would survive whether or not the law deemed it a nuisance. By
contrast, if transaction costs were sufficiently high, the choice of the initial legal rule
might be the one that prevailed even if it were not the most efficient. In sum, transaction
costs are what give the common law legal system its relevance.
None of this exercise had much to do with antitrust. However, Coase did identify
a rather special and very small market for purposes of economic analysis. At the time
Sturges v. Bridgman was decided London undoubtedly contained hundreds if not
thousands of physicians and at least as many confectioners. Further, there were
certainly thousands of locations from which the two trades could be practiced.
Nevertheless, the relationship between Sturges and Bridgman was unquestionably a
“market” in which the two were forced to bargain with one another. This market existed
by virtue of previous commitments. Sturges and Bridgman had locked themselves into
a situation from which extraction was costly. If either Sturges or Bridgman could
costlessly have relocated to another location that was equally satisfactory in every way
then no dispute would ever have gone to court. These “Coasean markets” are in fact a
form of bilateral monopoly.
At the most general level, the use of transaction cost economics in antitrust is an
exercise in examining conduct by reference to Coasean markets, while power is
assessed by reference to neoclassical markets. Indeed, for Williamson market power
becomes the defining characteristic and a strong prerequisite for anticompetitive vertical
arrangements.56 Analyzing business firm conduct in a Coasean market is important for
understanding its rationales and the full range of possible effects, but analyzing it in
relation to the larger neoclassical market is essential to determining whether the
conduct poses a threat to the economy generally. As long as antitrust policy has kept
these two kinds of markets distinct, transaction cost analysis has provided a powerful
tool for antitrust analysis. Occasionally, as in the 1992 Kodak decision,57 the courts
have confused one type of market with the other and sent antitrust policy off in the
wrong direction.
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Coasean Markets and the Boundaries of Firms

Antitrust’s central behavioral concern is with business firm structure and business
firm conduct that threaten to reduce marketwide output. Coasean markets are
interesting from an antitrust perspective because Coasean markets have precisely the
same boundaries as Coasean firms. In his 1937 essay, The Nature of the Firm, Coase
argued that the costs of using the market determine the boundaries of the firm. 58 Or, to
say it differently, internal production and external procurement both impose costs,
although the costs differ. A firm intent on maximizing its value chooses internal
production right up to the point that the marginal cost of producing internally equals the
marginal cost of external procurement, and vice versa.59 The firm’s boundaries are
defined by the line at which the two are in equipoise. Precisely the same thing is true of
Sturges and Bridgman, the physician and confectioner in Coase’s example.60 They
maximize value by bargaining with each other up to the point that the marginal value of
reaching a bargain equals the marginal value of moving away.
Transaction cost economics builds on this insight, which simultaneously tells us
not only what a firm’s boundaries will be, but also who are likely to be its bargaining
partners in outside markets and what those bargains will look like. For example, an
exclusivity provision in a contract permits a firm to retain some of the control and
disciplinary advantages of internal production, while sharing investment costs and risk.
When analyzed in this way a wide variety of practices, including but not limited to
exclusive dealing, tying, loyalty discounts, and price and dealer placement restrictions,
are nothing more than devices for permitting Coasean markets to behave more like
firms.
Coase’s Nature of the Firm applied transaction cost analysis to determine when a
firm uses internal coordination or the external market in order to procure certain inputs
or distribution. However, that article tended to treat the market itself as a kind of “black
box,” in the sense that the only relevant decision was whether to make or to buy. By
contrast, The Problem of Social Cost focused on the problem of how bargaining results
are achieved. The subsequent work of Williamson and others discerned that the array
of market choices are in fact incredibly diverse, ranging from simple one-shot “classical”
contracts to long-term relational contracts capable of specifying everything that internal
managers could specify. The Problem of Social Cost also assumed that firms’ previous
commitments determine the range of bargaining partners and the kinds of bargains that
will maximize joint value. Sturges and Bridgman are not forced to bargain with each
other because of the particular goods and services that they produce; those are sold in
competitive markets by hundreds of firms. Rather, they are locked together by asset
specificity—the fact that each has invested in a particular business at a particular
location, making extraction more costly than reaching a deal. The relation between
Sturges and Bridgman was the same as the relationship that existed between General
Motors and Fisher Body Works when the two were independent firms. They were
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specialists locked to each other by previous commitments.61 Indeed, for Williamson
asset specificity is the “most important and most distinctive” attribute of transaction cost
economics.62
This analysis explains both firm structure and bargaining behavior without
reference in the first instance to monopoly power. The firm maximizes its own value by
deciding whether to produce inside or procure outside; the participants in a Coasean
market maximize joint value by bargaining that takes their previous commitments and
long term goals into account. Nothing need be said about output reduction or higher
prices outside. At the same time, however, efficient bargaining sometimes breaks
down, leading to lower output and higher prices. In those cases antitrust can have a
role to play.
IV.

The Many Faces of Bilateral Monopoly; Double Marginalization

A.

TCE and bilateral monopoly

Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost63 is an extension of the bilateral monopoly
problem. By virtue of previous commitments (asset specificity), pairs of firms are thrust
into a position where the potential net payoff of reaching a further bargain is greater
than the payoff of abandoning this position and starting over. What makes these
situations interesting is that firms seek them out because there are gains to be had from
joint specialization. I have used the term “Coasean market” rather than “bilateral
monopoly” because these markets are not necessarily bilateral at all. Often they involve
many participants, such as the smokestack and the 100 downwind business- and homeowners, or the national franchisor with 1000 franchisees. Further, the term monopoly
suggests something that these relationships are not. In most cases, as in Sturges v.
Bridgman, the bargainers have little or no market power in the various markets in which
they sell their products or services. They are monopolists only in the unique and very
limited sense that efficient bargaining forces them to make deals with each other and no
one else. At the same time they are “markets” in the sense that the persons in them
have a profit-based incentive to bargain with each other rather than moving outside.
Coase implicitly assumed the existence of such markets in his writing, as has the
extensive literature on transaction cost economics and the business firm. 64
Bargaining in Coasean markets typically yields arrangements and practices that
seem inconsistent with perfect competition—transfer prices that are above cost, price
discrimination and nonlinear pricing, exclusivity provisions, tying and bundling, and
contractual impositions on the prices, locations, and practices of trading partners. In
61
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classical political economy goods were generic and distribution was unspecialized. As
a result, everyone traded with everyone else. Building on this premise, the leverage
theory was inclined to be suspicious of situations where specific buyers and sellers in
the distribution process were locked in to one another by long term contractual
requirements. This suspicion accounts for many of the harsh rules that antitrust applied
to vertical contractual practices as well as vertical ownership integration through the
1970s.65
By contrast, the Chicago school understood that these practices are perfectly
consistent with general competitive conditions, but its focus on the impossibility of
leveraging inclined it not to see any opportunities for harm whatsoever. That is, they
tended to believe that no contract a monopolist or dominant firm made, other than
collusion with rivals, would enable it to reduce output profitably more than it was already
doing.
For example, as noted above, free-riding—a transaction cost explanation—plays
a very minor role in Bork’s analysis of RPM.66 The free rider explanation is a “defense”
or at least an “explanation,” in the sense that it gives a benign accounting of a practice
that is prima facie suspicious. But Bork never got to that second point. Rather, he tried
to show that, however much power a firm had to begin with, it could not get more by
RPM. By contrast, the economics of transaction costs has produced a significant
literature on the manifold nonmonopolistic rationales for RPM.67 Nevertheless, certain
instances of RPM, particularly when instigated by dealers, represent opportunities for
either monopoly or double marginalization, and both of those can cause real consumer
losses. As a result, as developed briefly below, antitrust intervention is sometimes
appropriate.
Coasean markets behave like bilateral monopolies in the sense that within them
price is indeterminate. As in any orthodox Coase theorem story, even if the firms are
able to agree on the joint maximizing output, the price has to be bargained and there is
no structurally “correct” single answer. For example, if a manufacturer with market
power has costs of $4, distribution costs of $3, and the profit-maximizing price is $10,
there are $3 in economic profits to be made. If the manufacturer can sell efficiently
through a competitive dealer network it will retain the markup for itself, permitting the
dealers only a competitive return. However, if the dealership market is limited, the
dealers themselves may have market power and may be in a position to bargain with
the manufacturer over how the overcharge is distributed among them. In an
unstructured setting this lack of a determinate price can lead to cycling and instability
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problems.68 In most vertical business contracting settings, however, the contractual
form establishes a “hierarchy” that imposes stability. For example, in the typical
franchise setting the franchisor establishes a contract form and bargains with each
franchisee individually. The franchisees may have little opportunity to collaborate with
each other or cycle through counteroffers. In this respect the structure of the franchise
arrangement resembles a business firm more than a market.
Fisher Body and General Motors represent an extreme case of cospecialization,
where each firm’s previous commitments locked it into doing business with the other.
However such situations are hardly rare. Franchising is another, where often the
franchisee firm lacks any identity apart from the name, business format and products of
the franchisor. For example, consider the vast number of independently owned
McDonald’s franchises across the country, whose business methods, outward
appearance and menus are virtually identical. But even in less extreme situations
dealers make investments that are specific to a particular manufacturer’s product, and
manufacturers for their part make investments in these dealers. This is how bilateral
monopoly relationships get started, but both manufacturers and dealers embrace such
opportunities in any event. Indeed, the entire principle behind the development of
modern contractual distribution systems is that the gains more than offset any
transaction problems that arise from this form of co-investment.69
Simple bilateral monopoly is not an antitrust problem because bilateral monopoly
has no consequences for market prices and output. For example, the relationship
between physician Sturges and confectioner Bridgman is a bilateral monopoly even
though physicians’ services, confectionary, and the buildings suitable to these
professions are all sold in perfectly competitive markets. In that case the parties might
engage in costly bargaining or one of them might take advantage of the other in ways
that implicate contract or perhaps tort law. But no arrangement that they make has
antitrust significance because the market output and price of medical services,
confectionary, or commercial real estate will not be affected. This was the error that the
Supreme Court majority made in the 1992 Kodak case. The customers’ purchase of
durable Kodak photocopiers placed them into a bilateral monopoly relationship with
Kodak to the extent that the customers needed aftermarket parts that only Kodak could
supply. In his dissent Justice Scalia likened the situation to one in which a swimming
pool contractor discovers a five-ton boulder buried in the customer’s yard after
excavation is well under way. Unless this contingency has been specified in the
contract the parties are now locked into a bilateral monopoly situation.70 However,
residential back yards and swimming pool contractors are both competitive, and the
resolution of this dispute will have no impact on the market price or output of homes,
homes with swimming pools, contracting services, or any other antitrust market that
might be relevant to the dispute. It might, however, affect how wealth is distributed as
between the contractor and the homeowner, and if bargaining breaks down it might
68
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mean a suboptimal resolution. For example, the homeowner might refuse to pay any
more causing the contractor to abandon the work and lose her investment. Even if
Kodak lacked market power in its photocopy machines, it still might have been able to
extract high aftermarket prices from customers who needed repair parts and may have
been able to deceive them initially about lifetime ownership costs. But this is a matter
for contract law or the tort law of misrepresentation, not of antitrust.
When at least one firm in a distribution market has a serious amount of market
power, however, the welfare of consumers depends on how well functioning the market
is. At that point, if bargaining breaks down, antitrust may have a role to play. For
example, suppose that A is a monopoly manufacturer of a product and B is its monopoly
dealer, or B represents a cartel of all of A’s dealers in a particular retail market. In a
well functioning market A and B should be able to negotiate themselves to the profitmaximizing output. The division of the profits is indeterminate, but consumers would be
indifferent to that outcome as well because the final price would be the same. The
extent of monopoly will not be greater because the firm in question uses restrictive
contracts to distribute its product, provided that the dominant firm and its dealers reach
the joint maximizing agreement.
Nevertheless, this outcome is much less favorable than one alternative
possibility, which occurs when B represents a group of dealers who are competitive visà-vis one another. To be sure, the “optimal” markup remains the same. However, the
indeterminacies of bilateral monopoly are such that a great amount of haggling and
monitoring may be necessary to achieve it, and given that transaction costs are positive
there is no good reason to think that it will be achieved. So both monopolist A and
consumers are better off if the dealership market operates competitively.
Finally, if both the manufacturer and the dealer(s) have market power in their
respective output markets the bilateral monopoly situation threatens double
marginalization, which does injure consumers. Double marginalization is fundamentally
a transaction cost problem.71 That is, with zero transactions costs vertically related
firms with market power would agree on the joint maximizing output, but in fact they
frequently do not. As far as antitrust policy is concerned, the best solution in markets
where market power is capable of being exercised is to prevent bilateral monopoly
situations from occurring in the first place. The second best, where bilateral monopoly
already exists, is to distinguish those practices reasonably calculated to permit the firms
to reach the joint maximizing result from those which are likely to cause suboptimal
bargaining and thus consumer harm.
B.

Double marginalization

One situation in which bilateral monopoly raises competitive concerns is when it
leads to double marginalization.72 This is a special case of bilateral monopoly that
arises when the two firms also have market power in the greater markets in which they
71
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sell. In that case the rest of the economy also has an interest in whether the two
participants are able to reach a joint maximizing result.
Double marginalization problems occur in both vertically related markets and
markets for complements. The latter the situation is sometimes referred to as the
“Cournot complements” problem, but the fundamental analysis is the same.73 The
relationships among the producers of complementary products are akin to bilateral
monopoly problems because one assumption is that the two firms involved cannot
simply avoid the problem by dealing with someone else. For instance, a gasoline
refiner with market power might face a double-marginalization problem if a gasoline
retailer downstream had market power in its own retail market as well, but the problem
would not exist if the refiner could costlessly switch to a competitive retailer.
Importantly, however, firms in a relationship where double marginalization is threatened
may be in a position to bargain to the joint maximizing position, which is the single
monopoly markup level. That level not only maximizes the two firms’ aggregate profits,
but it is also better for consumers because it leads to higher output and lower prices.
Transaction cost analysis can play a major role in the assessment of Coasean markets
(bilateral monopolies) where double marginalization is threatened.
Consider the figure, which illustrates a simple double marginalization problem.
The demand curve, D, represents final demand for a good that has one manufacturer
and one dealer. The monopoly manufacturer has marginal costs of MC1 and maximizes
its profits by equating marginal cost and marginal revenue, charging a price of P1 and
reducing output to Q1. The dealer, who is also a monopolist in its downstream market
purchases at price P1 and maximizes its own profits. For simplicity we assume that the
dealer has no costs other than the cost of the good being sold. As a result price P1 also
represents the dealer’s marginal costs. The dealer then sets a price determined by the
intersection of its marginal cost curve with marginal revenue, that is, by engaging in
“marginalization” a second time. Now output drops to level Q1 and price rises to level
P2. If there were a third firm in the distribution chain, output would go down even further
and price would rise even more. In sum, the more monopolists in the distribution chain,
the more output declines and prices go up. In the figure, the demand curve is linear.
As a result each successive monopolist cuts output in half. However, the output
reduction could be greater than or less than half depending on the shape of the demand
curve. The amount of the price increase with each successive monopolist depends on
the price elasticity of demand at the output point.
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Clearly double marginalization harms consumers. Importantly, however, it is also
suboptimal for the two sellers in the figure. Under single monopoly, profits are equal to
the rectangle fbce. Under double marginalization, however, the manufacturer’s profits
drop to rectangle fade and the retailer’s profits are ghaf. Further, triangle hab
represents a second “deadweight loss triangle”—that is, increased consumer harm that
is not offset by increased producer profits. Double marginalization both reduces
aggregate supplier (manufacturer + dealer) profits and increases the monopoly
deadweight loss.
Consumers would be better off if the double marginalization was eliminated. For
example, the manufacturer might be able to find a competitively behaving dealer.74
Alternatively, double marginalization could be eliminated if the manufacturer and dealer
could agree with each other to divide up the profits available from rectangle fbce, thus
restoring output and reducing price back to the single monopoly level. This presents a
classic problem in bilateral monopoly bargaining, no different from the one faced by
Sturges and Bridgman. The two firms are in a position to maximize value if they can
agree about how to divide up the surplus.75
However, while the joint maximizing output in the figure is clearly identified as
quantity Q1 and price P1, the question of how the surplus that is available will be divided
does not have a determinate answer. As a result the parties may not be able to reach
the joint maximizing result on their own.
As noted previously, double marginalization can apply either to vertically related
products or else to complements. A precondition is that both firms have some market
power and that one firm is not in a position to avoid the power of the other at low cost by
dealing with someone else. That is, double marginalization is a special case of bilateral
monopoly. In cases of oligopoly there might be more than one firm at each level, but
74
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each of the firms has some market power.76 Pricing in excess of marginal cost is
common in product-differentiated markets.77 To that extent, the market power of
vertically related firms is simply a cost of using the market as opposed to internal
production.
As originally developed in the industrial organization and antitrust literature, the
double marginalization problem was treated as one of static monopoly and the principal
means of avoiding it was vertical merger or new entry.78 One very prominent industrial
organization economist, Joe Bain, downplayed the problem. He treated all forms of
bilateral monopoly, including pairs of firms with power in their sales markets, as
examples of countervailing power that would produce more competitive prices than
single-level monopoly.79 Today we are more likely to view double marginalization as a
transacting problem in which ownership vertical integration is only one of the
alternatives for addressing it. Basically, firms faced with double marginalization have
three choices:
(1) accept the consequences of double marginalization, which might be the best
alternative if internal production is costly and alternative (3) is unavailable; for
example, a manufacturer selling to a market-dominating local dealer may
have no choice but to accept that dealer’s high markups as a cost of doing
business;
(2) the neoclassical solution, which is integrate by ownership into the other
production level, whether by merger or new entry; or
(3) the “bargaining” solution, which is to enter into one of many types of
contractual arrangements under which the two vertically related firms
increase output and cut price to the joint maximizing level.
Recognizing that both options (2) and (3) can result in lower prices and higher
output, antitrust would respond with a more benign attitude toward vertical new entry,
vertical acquisitions, and vertical contracting, although not necessarily with per se
legality. This of course requires examination of the economics of various types of
distribution contracts. Perversely, antitrust policy has been counterproductive to the
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extent that it has prohibited the parties from reaching a bargain that will maximize their
joint profits. For example, until Albrecht was overruled in 1997,80 maximum RPM was
per se unlawful. The most likely use of maximum RPM is to prohibit dealers from taking
greater-than-competitive markups. As a result, antitrust policy made this route toward
elimination of double marginalization unavailable. As developed below, a harsh rule
against tying and discounting practices can have similar effects.81
C.

Eliminating or reducing double marginalization as an antitrust defense

Antitrust is relevant to problems of double marginalization in two ways. First,
private contracting practices, both vertical and complementary as well as horizontal,82
can be devices for eliminating or reducing it, thus benefitting consumers. Second,
double marginalization serves to explain why some vertical practices are harmful, and
transaction costs may serve to explain why private contracting is inadequate for
addressing them. Indeed, in some cases contracts can create or exacerbate doublemarginalization problems. In these, antitrust intervention may be appropriate.83
1.
MAXIMUM RPM
As noted previously,84 maximum RPM is readily
explained as a bargaining device for eliminating double marginalization. In this case the
upstream manufacturer or franchisor simply specifies a price level that will hold the
dealer’s markup to costs. Assuming that the dealer cannot enlarge its markup in other
ways, such as by reducing valuable services, the manufacturer can get back to the
single monopoly price level. If the manufacturer is a monopolist that price will reflect no
more than the amount of power that it has. If the manufacturer is a competitor, then the
output price should be competitive as well. For example, in the State Oil case, which
overruled previous doctrine and adopted a rule of reason for maximum RPM, the
individual dealer may have had power in its local retail market but there is no reason for
80
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thinking that State Oil, a relatively small player in the much larger supply market, had
significant market power.85
2.
DUAL DISTRIBUTION
Dual distribution occurs when a firm uses
independent dealers and owned dealerships simultaneously. Some earlier decisions
held that dual distribution was an exacerbating factor that served to make a restraint
horizontal,86 because the independent dealers competed with the manufacturer’s owned
dealer. More recently, however, the courts have uniformly recognized that dual
distribution should be regarded as a vertical practice and assessed under the rule of
reason.87
As the literature on TCE has developed at great length, a firm can specify
virtually everything in a contract that it can specify within an employment relationship or
hierarchy. So why the trouble and expense of maintaining two distribution modes? One
explanation is that dual distribution operates in the same way as maximum RPM does.
It imposes maximum prices on dealers, not by contract, but rather by giving them a
manufacturer-owned competitor. 88 For example, suppose that a reasonable distribution
markup is from a wholesale price of $8 to a retail price of $10, but that an independent
dealer or dealers in an area persistently charges prices in the $12–$14 range. The
manufacturer could eliminate this double marginalization either by imposing maximum
RPM to a retail price of $10, or else it could place its company-owned dealership in the
area and charge a retail price of $10, thus forcing independent dealers to compete with
it. For thirty years prior to 1997, maximum RPM was unlawful per se,89 and this very
likely made dual distribution an attractive alternative. Today a firm would be likely to
select contractual as opposed to self-distribution in a particular area by making the
same calculation that the business firm always makes—that is, by comparing net
marginal costs and gains from the two forms of distribution. The exercise of market
power by dealers is a cost of using the market. Clearly, elimination of double
marginalization could be one source of gain to both manufacturers and consumers.
3.
QUANTITY AND LOYALTY DISCOUNTS
Another easy example of
elimination of double marginalization is the quantity discount, which can be a device for
the manufacturer and dealer to share the gains that result from reaching the joint85
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Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711, 721–23 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir.
1969).
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Elecs. Commc’ns Corp. v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc., 129 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1997);
Mesirow v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 703 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1983); Graphic Products Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK
Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983); Davis Watkins v. Serv. Merch., 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982);
Copy-Data Sys., Inc. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 663 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1981); H & B Equip. Co. v. Int’l
Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978); see 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38.
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See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE §11.6e (3d ed. 2005).
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Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3
(1997).
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maximizing output level. Looking at the figure above, suppose that without a discount a
dealer would sell Q2 units at price P2. Now the manufacturer offers a progressive
quantity discount that reaches its maximum point at output level Q1. This rewards the
dealer with a lower price for purchasing (and selling) more and in effect operates as a
mechanism for sharing the monopoly markup.90 In order to succeed the discount would
have to be sufficiently large so that the dealer can come out ahead by reducing its own
price to level P1. As the figure also illustrates, joint maximization produces enough
surplus to permit this to occur.
A loyalty, or market share, discount differs from a quantity discount in that the
discount is fixed to a percentage of the reseller’s purchases rather than an absolute
quantity or dollar amount.91 Loyalty discounts are better from the manufacturer’s
viewpoint and more competitive than quantity discounts when the downstream market is
concentrated and the firms are of various sizes. Quantity discounts discriminate against
smaller firms that are unable to purchase in the same volume as larger firms. As a
result, quantity discounts can give larger firms a price umbrella or in extreme cases
even drive smaller firms out of the market altogether. Once again, the concern is
essentially of double marginalization: the manufacturer wants to keep the downstream
market as competitive as possible, and keeping smaller firms in the market facilitates
this goal. For example, if the downstream market contains three large dealers and
seven small ones, a quantity discount that the seven smaller dealers cannot obtain will
give the three larger dealers a cost advantage over the others. In an extreme case it
could even drive the smaller dealers out of business. In any event, the three larger
dealers will be able to collude and reduce output below the manufacturer’s profitmaximizing level.
Aside from these effects on the robustness of downstream competition, loyalty
discounts do not have as direct an impact on reseller output as quantity discounts do.
Nevertheless, they are very important in certain markets where high output is key to
cost minimization. This is true of any market subject to economies of scale, but
particularly those with strong IP rights components.
The Intel microprocessor situation may provide an example. A large part of the
cost of developing a microprocessor chip is R&D, design, and the manufacturing of
dies.92 These costs are fixed over the production run of a particular chip, which is
90

See Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Law in the United
States, 1 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 115 (2005).
91
For other double marginalization issues that might be addressed by market share discounts akin to
exclusive dealing, see Gianluca Faella, The Antitrust Assessment of Loyalty Discounts and Rebates, 4 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 375 (2008); Sreya Kolay, Greg Shaffer & Janusz Ordover, All-Units Discounts
in Retail Contracts, 13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 429 (2004).
92

See Herbert Hovenkamp, The FTC’s Anticompetitive Pricing Case Against Intel, CPI ANTITRUST
CHRON., Feb. 28, 2010, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546054;
Herbert Hovenkamp, The FTC and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531136.
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typically quite short. As a result, per chip production costs are very sensitive to output.
For example, if fixed development costs are $1 million and variable production costs are
$100 per chip, then production of 1000 chips would incur costs of $1100 each ($1000 in
amortized fixed costs plus $100 in production costs). But a production run of 100,000
chips would cut per chip costs to $110. If Intel built computers itself it would produce all
the chips it could consistent with computer demand. But when it sells chips to computer
manufacturers it is in a different situation. For example, if it must bid a price in advance
of the product cycle, the amount it can bid depends on the number of chips it can
produce. As reasonably anticipated output increases, the bid price can go down.
For any given chip, future demand is subject to two kinds of risks. One is a
general market risk that the demand for computers of a certain type will fall. The other
is the risk that a computer manufacturer will switch significant purchases to a different
manufacturer, thus reducing Intel’s output and raising per chip costs.
In such a situation the optimal strategy may very well be for Intel to assume the
market risk with respect to the chips. After all, the computer manufacturers will be
assuming it with respect to other parts of the computer. Further, to the extent that the
computer market is more competitive there may be less room for the manufacturers to
assume such risks.
The risk of individual manufacturer defection is a different problem, however,
because it is within the control of the computer manufacturers themselves. A market
share discount effectively shares that risk with the computer manufacturer by making
the lower price contingent on greater sales. It basically tells the computer maker that a
particular price is contingent on the computer maker’s use of a minimum number of
chips in relation to market demand. For example, setting market risks aside, if Intel can
predict that manufacturers will use 800,000 chips next year for computers with a
particular set of specifications it can bid a significantly lower price if it can have some
confidence that it will claim, say, 70% of those sales than if it cannot.
4.
TYING AND BUNDLED DISCOUNTS
Many famous old tying cases
involved tied products that were commodities sold in highly competitive markets, such
as the dry ice in the Carbice93 case or the salt in International Salt.94 In those cases
controlling double marginalization very likely does not explain the tie, although price
discrimination might.95 The typical tied products today, however, are not commodities.
They are usually manufactured products sold in product-differentiated markets,
sometimes protected by IP rights,96 or else they are specialized services such as the
93

Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31–32 (1931).
Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
95
See infra text accompanying notes 115–37. Price discrimination may not have explained the tie in
International Salt, however, because the tying agreement required the lessee of the machine to use the
defendant’s salt only if was sold at the competitive price. If the lessee was able to find a lower price
elsewhere that the lessor would not match then the lesee was free to purchase the salt elsewhere. See Int’l
Salt, 332 U.S. at 394–95 n.5. The most likely explanation of this particular tie was quality control.
96
E.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 861 (E.D. Ky. 2007)
(denying summary judgment on claim that printer/cartridge technological tie was unlawful); Tucker v.
94
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The relatively few exceptions occur

Tying almost always involves complementary products—that is, products that are
more valuable if they are used together.
As noted previously, the doublemarginalization problem for complements, often called the “Cournot complements”
problem, is similar to the one for vertical distribution.99 Indeed, the problem may be
more severe because the producers of complementary products are not always in a
position to deal with each other, while vertically related firms are. As a result,
opportunities for using bargaining to reach joint maximizing output levels may be
scarcer or may look more suspicious to antitrust enforcers.
The complementary goods problem might involve something like a computer and
a printer, an MP3 digital music player and downloaded music,100 or a computer
operating system and software applications.101 The products need not be monopolized,
but they do need to be in a sufficiently differentiated or concentrated market that prices
are above marginal cost. They can be sold in either fixed or variable proportions.102 In
such cases the printer manufacturer will charge its profit-maximizing price for the
printer, and the cartridge manufacturer will do the same for its cartridge. The two
separate markups can be significantly higher than the combined markup that would be
Apple Computer, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (refusing to dismiss complaint that
iPod/iTunes tie was per se unlawful); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(refusing to dismiss Sherman Act section1 claim that tying of Microsoft Windows OS and Internet
Explorer Browser was unlawful; condemning under Sherman Act section 2 Microsoft’s “commingling” of
Windows and Internet Explorer code).
97
E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (dicta reaffirming per se tying rule).
98
E.g., Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 447 n.6 (3d Cir. 1998) (pizza
dough); Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379 (5th Cir. 1994) (1995) (wax paper
for wrapping raw hamburger patties); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971)) (paper
plates, napkins, spices).
99
See, e.g., VISCUSI,. HARRINGTON & VERNON,supra note 72; JEAN T IROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 175–76 (1988).
100
Tucker v. Apple Computer, 493 F. Supp. 2d 1090.
101
Note the protests that arose during the Microsoft litigation when a proposed breakup would have
placed the Windows operating system and the Microsoft applications in the hands of different firms. The
complaint was that it would lead to double marginalization. Kenneth G. Elzinga, David S. Evans &
Albert L. Nichols, United States v. Microsoft: Remedy or Malady, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 633, 680
(2001); Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, An Economist’s Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft, 15 J. ECON.
PERSP. 25 (2001) (“[T]he sum of the operating system and application prices set by an integrated
monopolist will be lower than the sum of those prices when set separately by two independent firms each
with significant market power.”); Stan J. Liebowitz, An Expensive Pig in a Poke: Estimating the Cost of
the District Court’s Proposed Breakup of Microsoft, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 727 (2001); Dari-Mattiacci
& Parisi, supra note 73.
102
James L. Hamilton & Ibrahim Mqasqas, Double Marginalization and Vertical Integration: New
Lessons from Extensions of the Classic Case, 62 S. ECON. J. 567, 581–84 (1996). The outcome can be
more harmful if one party is a monopolist, the other is an oligopolist, and after the union the monopolist
cuts off the non-partnering oligopolists. See Michael Waterson, Vertical Integration, Variable
Proportions and Oligopoly, 92 ECON. J. 129 (1982).
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taken by a firm that sold both products together. Further, profits would be higher for the
single firm than for the two firms separately, and consumers would be better off
because output would be higher and prices lower. In short, the story for complementary
products is identical to the story for vertical integration, illustrated in the figure, and has
been known in the economics literature for at least as long.103 Complementary rights in
intellectual property sold by separate firms can lead to the same result, such as the
“royalty stacking” that occurs when different firms own patents that are essential to the
production of some good or process.104 In such cases welfare would be increased if a
single firm sold the complementary goods.
Assume that firm A makes a computer while firm B makes a compatible printer.
Both goods are sold in oligopoly markets at prices above cost. Given that these prices
maximize profits, neither firm wishes to cut the price of its own product. At this point
firm A would have an incentive to acquire firm B, or vice versa, or perhaps it would enter
the printer market on its own. Firm A’s profit-maximizing price for a computer/printer
combination would be lower than the sum of the prices charged by the separate firms.
Firm A would also earn more, output would be higher, and consumers would benefit as
well.
Firm A could accomplish this in two ways. It could simply tie computers and
printers, refusing to sell the two separately. That would benefit consumers who wanted
one of each, as most presumably would. However, it would cut out of the market those
who needed only one of the two products, perhaps as a replacement. Alternatively, it
could charge the single product profit-maximizing price for each product separately but
a lower price for the combination—that is, it would use a bundled discount to eliminate
double marginalization for those buyers who regarded the goods as complements at the
time of purchase.105
But why shouldn’t we force the firm simply to offer the computer and the printer
separately at the lower prices that it would charge if they were in the bundle? This
would also eliminate the double marginalization and it might satisfy those who find the
tie unacceptable on some other ground. For example, suppose that the individual profit103

The theory of double marginalization of complementary products was developed even before
Cournot, in CHARLES ELLET, JR., AN ESSAY ON THE LAWS OF TRADE, IN REFERENCE TO THE WORKS OF
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1839); see also R.G.D. ALLEN, MATHEMATICAL
ANALYSIS FOR ECONOMISTS (1938). Both are discussed in Dari-Mattiacci & Parisi, supra note 73.
104
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 82.
105
See Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52
ARIZ.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443284; 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, , supra note 38,
¶1712b; Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 EMORY L.J. 423,
434–36 (2006). On the theory, see Michael L. Katz, Vertical Contractual Relations, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 655, 673 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); TIROLE,
supra note 99, at 174–77. The same theory has been applied to the bundling of telecommunications
services. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet:
The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L REV. 1822, 1846–47 (2007); Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory K.
Leonard & J. Gregory Sidak, Does Bell Company Entry into Long-Distance Telecommunications Benefit
Consumers?, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 483–84 (2002).
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maximizing prices of the computer and printer are $1000 and $400, respectively, while
the profit-maximizing price for the package when sold by a single firm is $1200. Would
it not be preferable on policy grounds to require the manufacturer to sell the two
products separately at, say, $900 and $300?
First of all, if none of the rival printer companies cut their price to match then the
result would be the same as tying in any event. That is, the buyer would take both from
firm A. Second, however, if one or more of the other printer companies did cut the
printer price to $300, then firm A would not capture all of the printer sales. A premise of
the double-marginalization story is that the price cut on the printer is profitable because
the manufacturer will obtain the higher output that accrues to both the computer and the
printer. If it cannot tie and be assured of getting all of the printer sales, then it will not
cut its price.
The double-marginalization explanation of practices such as tying is robust and
has broad application in markets characterized by single firm dominance or product
differentiation.106 Tying and bundled discounts can operate as a kind of “reverse
leverage” in cases where both the bundled products are sold in less than perfectly
competitive markets. Indeed, the only time that double-marginalization concerns are
not relevant is when one of the goods is a fungible commodity sold under highly
competitive conditions, such as the salt or dry ice in well known tying decisions.107 As a
result arguments for reviving a version of the leverage theory, such as Einer Elhauge’s
provocative 2009 article,108 are limited in their scope to the tying of commodities, where
double-marginalization problems are not likely to arise. In many cases involving
bundled discounts, the bundled goods are product-differentiated and specialized and
the inference of significant price/marginal cost margins is great.109
D.

Antitrust as a Corrective: Dealer-Induced RPM and the Rule of Reason

The other side of the double-marginalization problem is that high transaction
costs may interfere with manufacturers’ efforts to control it by contract. At that point the
legal system becomes relevant and antitrust can be brought to bear in appropriate
circumstances. The precondition is reduced output and higher consumer prices.

106

See TIROLE, supra note 99, at 175.
Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283
U.S. 27, 31–32 (1931). As one recent decision observed, at least in the printer market manufacturers
commonly cut the price of the printer (tying product) to cost or even lower and place the markup in the
cartridge (tied product). See Xerox Corp. v. Media Sciences, Inc., 660 F.Supp.2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (“As is true of other printer manufacturers, Xerox generally sells its printers at a low margin or a
loss, hoping to earn a profit through later sales of high margin ink”).
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Elhauge,supra note 11.
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See, e.g., Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Group, L.P., No. CV 02-4770 MRP, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26916, at *27 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2004) (plaintiff challenging defendant’s discount practices,
which included bundled discounts, had profit margins of between 45% and 83% during the period of
claimed exclusion). The Ninth Circuit eventually entered an order finding liability on some claims but not
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A good example is vertical price and nonprice restraints, an area where the TCE
literature has made important contributions. The free rider explanation for these
restrictions, which dates to the 1960s, is but one example. Manufacturers use resale
price maintenance and nonprice restraints in order to achieve some of the efficiencies of
intrafirm distribution while preserving the risk sharing and incentive features of
contractual distribution mechanisms. For example, a firm distributing its own product
would ordinarily provide the optimal level of distribution services. The free rider
explanation for RPM shows how it can emulate that level when using independent
dealers and alternative contractual mechanisms are too costly or ineffectual. By the
same token the self-distributing manufacturer would sell its full product line through
each store. In a contractual distribution network it may have to offer inducements to
dealers to carry the full line, often by using RPM in order to guarantee margins on the
more popular goods so as to prevent “cream skimming” by other retailers.110
Alternatively, a single firm engaged in self-distribution would place the optimal number
of stores in a community, and a firm engaged in contractual distribution would try to
replicate that allocation by using territorial restrictions or other limits on dealer location.
As noted previously, vertical restraints can often be used to limit double
marginalization. However, there may also be situations in which vertical restraints are
used for the opposite purpose, which is to facilitate or exacerbate double
marginalization. These are situations in which bargaining has failed to reach the joint
maximizing result, and thus the legal system has a role to play. For example, antitrust
legitimately has an interest in the problem of dealer cartels or powerful individual
dealers.111 Well-placed local dealers may be in a position to exercise market power in
their individual retail markets. Depending on their power vis-à-vis the manufacturer,
they may be able to extract RPM on competing dealers for their own benefit, but to the
detriment of an efficient distribution system. The cost of moving resources being what it
is, it may be less costly for the manufacturer to comply than to set up alternative equally
satisfactory dealerships. The result will be higher local prices.112
If the manufacturer has some market power, then the risk of dealership cartels
and powerful dealers is double marginalization. The manufacturer sets its profitmaximizing price, determined by consumer demand less distribution costs. In that case
both the manufacturer and consumers are best off if distribution is competitive.
However, a cartel of locally powerful dealers that is able to impose RPM on the reluctant
manufacturer can also impose higher prices on consumers. Once again, whether the
manufacturer can combat this effectively depends on the circumstances.
110

See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, ¶¶ 1614f, 1615d; Raymond Deneckere, Howard P.
Marvel & James Peck, Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance, 111 Q.J. ECON.
885 (1996); see also David A. Butz, Vertical Price Controls with Uncertain Demand, 40 J.L. & ECON.
433 (1997); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement
Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1988).
111
See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, ¶ 1604.
112
See, e.g., Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2008)
(dealer cartel); Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (powerful
dealer).
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It is no answer to say that the manufacturer and the powerful dealer might be
able to agree on the profit-maximizing output, in which case the manufacturer will earn
less, the dealer will earn more, but overall output will be the same. The competitive
distribution network is still preferable to the bilateral monopoly that results from dealer
assertions of power that it need not have.
This is fundamentally a problem of transaction costs. If bargaining worked
perfectly, a manufacturer and its dealers would agree on the joint maximizing output
level and negotiate over the division of profits. But when a powerful established dealer
can frustrate this by insisting on higher local markups a manufacturer may be powerless
to resist, particular if vertical integration into retailing is not possible on account of the
need for distribution by multiproduct retailers. Famously, Dr. Miles itself was such a
case, involving RPM instigated by a cartel of retail druggists.113
What such an antitrust case requires is proof that the RPM is dealer-initiated.
This itself is problematic because dealers might “initiate” RPM simply by reporting free
riding, and using RPM to control that is clearly in the best interest of the manufacturer
as well. However, in a case such as Toys “R” Us,114 free riding does not seem to be a
robust explanation. Further, given that toy retailers sell numerous brands, vertical
integration into retailing does not seem to be a viable alternative. The defendant may
simply have been interfering in manufacturers’ efforts to establish a competitive
distribution system.
V.

Transaction Costs and Price Discrimination

Price discrimination occurs when a firm obtains higher ratios of price to marginal
cost from some buyers than from others. Systematic price discrimination does not
occur under perfect competition because, by definition, some prices are not at marginal
cost.115 So price discrimination presupposes at least some power to set a price above
marginal cost to particular customers. The amount of power is not substantial, however,
and nearly everyone agrees that sufficient market power to have antitrust
consequences cannot be inferred from the existence of price discrimination alone.116
Indeed, the world is filled with arrangements, such as fast food franchises, where the
firms are clearly in highly competitive markets but price discrimination is used to set
113

See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 331–48 (1991)
(discussing cartel of retail druggists that used RPM to limit price cutting).
114
Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d 575.
115
In some cases of nonsustainable predation a firm might charge a pocket of customers a price below
marginal cost in order to eliminate rivals. But this is not likely to be a profitable strategy in a perfectly
competitive market.
116
See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, ¶ 721; Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost
Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 101 (2002); Benjamin Klein,
Market Power in Aftermarkets, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 143 (1996); Benjamin Klein, Market
Power in Franchise Cases in the Wake of Kodak, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 283 (1999); Benjamin Klein & John
Shepard Wiley, Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual
Property, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599 (2003).
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franchise fees proportioned to the amount of franchisee business rather than franchisor
costs.117
The ability to price discriminate need not be a function of monopoly at all and
often relates to some version of the bilateral monopoly problem. As noted previously,
the existence of Coasean markets is quite consistent with robust competition in the
broader market. But participants in a Coasean market are locked in to ongoing
relationships that make price discrimination possible and even desirable, just as the
firms in a traditional market are.118 For example, in the typical franchise case the
franchisor and franchisees are joined together by a contract plus a set of previous
commitments that makes exit undesirable. This is simply a corollary of the proposition
that the boundaries of a Coasean market are the same as the boundaries of a firm. 119
In a price discrimination scheme in a traditional market, disfavored purchasers (i.e.,
those charged the higher price) might prefer to escape to alternative arrangements but
market boundaries prevent them from doing so. The same thing is true of a Coasean
market. Opportunism, bounded rationality, and transaction costs fully explain the
arrangements.
For example, a firm about to enter the fast food industry as a supplier can profit
by sharing risk, and self-employed franchisees may have stronger incentives to do well
than far-flung employees would. If the firm built its own restaurants it would expect to
earn from them in proportion to their relative success, and franchising is an attractive
alternative to the extent that it replicates this opportunity while permitting franchisee to
share the risk. For its part, the nascent franchisee receives a method of doing
business, a recognized name and product, and the promise of high returns proportional
to its level of success. So it willingly puts up its share of the capital (the franchisee fee),
opens an outlet, and pays either a recurring fee proportional to sales120 or an
overcharge on various tied consumable products used in the franchised business.121 Ex
ante, the franchisee knows that its payments are proportional to sales and one certainly
cannot say that the prospect of high sales and accompanying high franchise fee is a
deterrent.122 Once entered, these arrangements are profitable and also durable, even
in competitive markets, because the value of a successful franchise is high and
extraction is too costly in relation to the available alternatives. For example, a high
volume McDonald’s franchise is highly profitable and desirable to its owner,
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E.g., Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 308 (4th Cir. 1980); Ungar v. Dunkin Donuts,
531 F.2d 1211, 1222 (3d Cir. 1976) (restaurant property, signs, and supplies); Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) (packaging; herbs); see Benjamin Klein & Lester Saft, The Law and
Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345, 347–48 (1985); 9 AREEDA &
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See supra text accompanying notes 53–58.
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notwithstanding that it is also highly profitable to the franchisor and probably at no more
expense than it incurs with the less successful franchisee.
In sum, the phenomenon that makes price discrimination possible in such cases
is not market power but rather the fact that assets are specialized and that transferring
to attractive alternative arrangements is not costless. Down the road a highly
successful franchisee may become resentful that its franchisor is earning high returns
on this particular franchisee’s business with no greater effort than it puts into the
business of less successful franchisees. But that outcome is a feature of joint risk
taking. And indeed, the resentment in this case is odd because one would guess that
the prospect that a particular franchisee would become highly successful would have
acted ex ante as an inducement rather than a deterrent to entry.
The case of price discrimination in aftermarket products is similar. Many price
discrimination ties involve arrangements in which the seller charges a low price
(sometimes less than marginal cost and sometimes even zero)123 for a tying product,
but overcharges on a tied product whose use varies with the intensity of use of the tying
product. A printer plus the stream of replaceable ink cartridges that a consumer
purchases is one example. The Supreme Court’s Kodak decision, which involved the
tying of aftermarket parts and service for customers who had previously purchased a
Kodak copier, is another.124
The aftermarket price discrimination tie is simply a bilateral monopoly problem in
which a contract specified in advance determines the terms. Going in, if the underlying
market is competitive a customer may be able to choose between a more expensive
printer with less costly cartridges, or vice versa. In Kodak the Supreme Court was
aware of this and made something of the fact that Kodak may have changed its policy
late in the copy machine’s lifecycle. As a result customers may have gotten a different
and less attractive bilateral monopoly deal than the one they had bargained for at the
beginning. But that change in policy is clearly not an antitrust problem, although it may
involve contract law or tortious misrepresentation<<probably both!>>.
Most
importantly, the story in and of itself does not implicate double marginalization or other
opportunity for higher output prices. Indeed, price discrimination in both franchise
situations and those involving aftermarket parts or service seems to be ubiquitous even
when the firms lack significant market power.125
Price discrimination ties can implicate both traditional monopoly concerns and
the concerns of transaction cost economics. Already in the 1950s, Chicago school
writing on variable-proportion tying arrangements saw them as price discrimination
devices,126 and the case law had seen them as such far earlier.127 This Chicago school
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story was not about transaction costs, however, but rather about the profitable ways in
which a monopolist might extract its overcharge. Indeed, Bowman assumed that the
seller was a monopolist and saw the variable-proportion tie as an alternative to the
monopolist’s selling of its primary good at different prices to different consumers—a
result he thought would be undermined by the monopolist’s inability to distinguish high
and low value customers or to segregate them sufficiently so as to prevent customer
arbitrage.128 This analysis tended to see gains from price discrimination ties by
assuming that the seller was a monopolist and comparing output under the tie with
output under simple linear pricing. As a result, for example, Bowman saw tying as a
“use of existing [market] power,” but not as creating the “addition of new power” by
leveraging.129 In this account the reduction in the price of the tying product typically
means that many more customers will purchase it, and this in turn tends to produce
greater sales of the tied product even though its costs are higher.130
The TCE story is, if anything even more benign because it starts out with a seller
who is not necessarily a monopolist. As a result, the welfare gains from the output
increases that attend price discrimination still apply and competition in the underlying
market offers even further protection for consumers. For example, within the Chicken
Delight franchise tying arrangement, the tie very likely produces an increased number of
franchises, increased product sales, and increased welfare by both the general welfare
and the consumer welfare measure.131 But if for some reason it does not, customers
can always go across the street to Kentucky Fried Chicken or McDonald’s. Transaction
cost analysis has improved on Bowman by extending his analysis to the ubiquitous
situations in which price discrimination ties are imposed by nonmonopolists.
Price discrimination ties, even by a monopolist, are rarely candidates for
condemnation on that ground because in the great majority of cases they improve
consumer as well as general welfare.132 In general, such ties involve second-degree
price discrimination, which is typically more benign than third-degree price
discrimination.
In a third-degree price discrimination scheme a seller is able to identify ex ante
customers who exhibit differential willingness to pay for some good and charge them
different prices. For example, a seller might charge commercial users of its stereo
equipment $100 and residential users $60.133 This type of discrimination creates a
the makers, they expecting a profit on their monopoly alone from the sale of fasteners or staples to those
having the machine.”); Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 105, at n.71.
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133
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distinguishing commercial and residential users); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
(software licensing agreement distinguishing commercial and noncommercial users). See Christina
Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474407.
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discontinuity in marginal valuation that transfers some sales from high-value to lowvalue customers. As a result consumer welfare can be reduced even if output remains
constant. In this illustration, for example, a commercial user who valued the stereo at
$90 would be denied the sale. Rather, that unit would be sold to someone for $60 even
though she valued it at far less than $90. As a result economists have known for nearly
a century that third-degree price discrimination reduces welfare unless it results in an
output increase.
By contrast, in the typical variable proportion tying case the seller reduces the
price of the tying good and increases the price of the tied good; however, the latter price
is the same for all. For example, a manufacturer might cut the price of its printer from
the stand-alone amount of $400 and instead charge $200, but it would raise the price of
tied cartridges from $25 to $40. In that case the seller would earn more from buyers
who used the printer more intensely, because they would consumer more ink cartridges.
The distortions come from the reduced price for the printer, which favors consumers
and brings more of them into the market, but also from the increased price of the
cartridge, which raises per use variable costs.134 Significantly, however, the higher
cartridge price is the same for everyone. Such ties can benefit consumers in a wider
variety of circumstances, even in the rare case where output falls as a result of the
tie.135 Further, such arrangements are common even in competitive markets. As a
result, as they become less favorable to consumers; switching out becomes more
attractive.
This analysis also suggests that vertical restraints that segregate buyers can be
more harmful price discrimination devices than ties are. While variable ties represent
instances of second-degree price discrimination, segregation restraints discriminate in
the third degree. For example, the manufacturer who uses vertically imposed customer
restrictions to segregate customers by class,136 or the patentee who uses field-of-use
restrictions for the same end,137 is engaged in third degree price discrimination.138
Welfare harm is more likely, although even here it should not be presumed.

VI.

A Brief Note on Foreclosure

This article has examined situations in which transaction cost economics can be
applied to vertical arrangements that threaten undue monopoly output limitations and
price markups. Historically, the term “leverage” very largely defined this debate, with
the structuralists believing that anticompetitive leverage was common, even when the
134
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affected markets were competitive,139 and the Chicago school largely denying the
existence of leverage in any form.
An equally important concern, which I largely leave for another day, is exclusion
or “foreclosure” of rivals. Once again the structuralists and the Chicago school
enthusiastically disagreed with one another. Led by Harvard-trained economists such
as Edward S. Mason and Joe S. Bain, the structuralists tended to see entry barriers as
a prominent feature of the economy, as a natural consequence of large-scale
manufacturing and product differentiation, and as a principal reason for poor
performance in concentrated and even not-so-concentrated industries.140
Bain,
undoubtedly the most prominent industrial organization economist of the structuralist
school, adopted a consequentialist definition that an entry barrier is any factor in a
market that permits incumbent firms to “persistently raise their prices above a
competitive level without attracting new firms to enter the industry.”141
In sharp contrast, the Chicago school adopted a much stricter neoclassical
approach that tended to see resources moving freely anytime an imbalance existed
between profits earned in one place and another. University of Chicago economist
George J. Stigler, who was much more concerned that firms not be punished for being
first movers, adopted a definition of entry barriers as a cost that “must be borne by a
firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry.”142
Stigler’s definition was driven by extreme doubts that conduct itself could deter entry.
Rather, he tended to see entry barriers as a consequence of scale economies or
government intervention, neither of which should or could be addressed by antitrust law.
The Antitrust Law treatise has always preferred the Bainian definition, finding it
more consistent with the policy goals of antitrust law, which is not to attack structure for
its own sake but rather to identify instances of anticompetitive, entry-deterring
conduct.143 Most of the case law has followed.144 In defense of this position it is
139
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important to note that antitrust law in this post-structuralist era does not punish structure
as such, but only conduct that is likely to be unreasonably exclusionary under the
circumstances. The Bainian definition seems more appropriate to the question being
asked. The relevant question is not whether more entry should be affirmatively
encouraged, but rather whether clearly anticompetitive conduct should be deterred.
Problematically, however, in one of the last embraces of structuralism, Areeda’s and
Turner’s original edition of Antitrust Law not only adopted the Bainian definition of entry
barriers but also proposed creation of a purely structural offense of “no-fault” monopoly,
a position that the present author disputes and both Congress and the courts have
avoided.145
TCE has reinvigorated the link between conduct and exclusion. One example is
the well-known debate between Areeda and Turner on one side and Oliver Williamson
on the other over the proper test for predatory pricing. Williamson believed that the
Areeda-Turner predatory pricing test was too lenient and did not adequately address the
threats imposed by longer run strategic behavior.146 Briefly, Williamson believed that
Areeda’s and Turner’s average variable cost test for actionable predation was much too
severe on plaintiffs and ignored significant possibilities of exclusionary pricing behavior
even at above-cost prices. Another area in which TCE has reinvigorated the analysis of
exclusionary practices is raising rivals’ costs (RRC), which begins with the premise that
many exclusionary practices are more easily rationalized as devices for increasing
rivals’ costs than as mechanisms for excluding them. In general, the RRC literature has
attempted to restore a meaningful conception of anticompetitive exclusion without a
return to the more severe apprehensions of the structuralist school, which tended to
view rivals and smaller firms as anesthetized patients rather than as vigorous
competitors with the general ability to respond in kind.147 At least some Chicago school
definition); Richard Gilbert, Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incumbency, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 105, at 475, 478 (“a barrier to entry is a rent that is derived from
incumbency.”).
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writers have been very critical.148 Resources are in fact quite mobile, but transaction
costs and the other attendant costs of resource movement must be taken into account
as well.
“Exclusionary” distribution agreements can present analogous problems in
transaction cost analysis. For example, interbrand free riding can be a particular
problem for manufacturers dealing through multibrand retailers.149
Ordinarily a
manufacturer engaged in self-distribution would not have an incentive to retail the
products of rivals in addition to its own. Exclusivity arrangements imposed on dealers
can make the manufacturer/dealer relationship behave more like a firm behaves. 150
Nevertheless, exclusive dealing and foreclosing ties can also impair competition.151
Other things equal, a dealer and its customers are best off when supply markets are
competitive, and unreasonably exclusionary arrangements can prevent such
competition from occurring.
VII.

Conclusion

This brief discussion of antitrust issues belies the complexity of analysis in
individual cases. For example, market power must be established and the line between
efficient and harmful bargaining will typically not be as clear as the illustrations suggest.
One advantage that both the structuralist school and the Chicago school had over TCE
antitrust analysis was their simplicity. Within the structuralist paradigm, industrial
concentration explained everything and most inferences were drawn in favor of
condemnation. Within Chicago school analysis, the impossibility of leveraging and the
mobility of resources explained everything and most inferences were drawn in favor of
exculpation. Transaction cost analysis is different, however; typically more specific to
the situation and requiring particularly close scrutiny in cases where significant market
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power is either present or realistically threatened. As a result, the transaction costs of
operating the legal system are necessarily higher.
Nevertheless, in cases challenging purely vertical arrangements the strong
presumptive rule must be legality. Anticompetitive deviations are not so exceptional
that antitrust policy can ignore them, but not so common that they should be presumed.

